When Will the US-Iran War End? Ceasefire, Peace Deal & Regime-Change Probabilities
Live probability tracker for the end of US-Iran hostilities. Combines Polymarket pricing across April/May/June horizons (permanent peace deal, ceasefire extensions, regime-fall, Trump end-of-operations announcement) with our calibrated probabilities, scenario tree, and evidence trail. Refreshes daily.
569 sources·5 perspectives
The Takeby 2026-06-30
US-Iran permanent peace deal signed by June 30, 2026
Market
28%
Our Call
21%
Δ
-7
Why we disagree
Structural nuclear incompatibility plus only 56 days remaining make permanent deal unlikely; May 4 escalation and fragile mediation suggest momentum toward conflict, not resolution.
What changes our mind
May 9–30 window: JPMorgan's projected date for OECD crude inventories hitting operational minimums — a supply crunch at this level would force emergency diplomatic movement or trigger another Brent spike above $114/barrel.
All forecasts
02
US-Iran permanent peace deal by December 31, 2026
By 2026-12-31
Market
51%
Our Call
38%
Δ
-13
Why we disagree
Anchored at Polymarket ~54%; haircut to 51% for IRGC autonomous escalation risk and nuclear talks structural impasse; economic collapse on both sides remains strongest convergence mechanism over longer horizon
Why our call differs from market
Permanent peace deals require sustained negotiation beyond structural impasses (nuclear talks gridlock, IRGC autonomy); 7-month timeline is too compressed given historical US-Iran agreement difficulty and 'permanent' bar.
03
Strait of Hormuz normalizes to 50%+ of pre-war traffic by May 31, 2026
By 2026-05-31
Market
14%
Our Call
10%
Δ
-4
Why we disagree
Consistent with Polymarket 15.5% YES; Project Freedom at 2 ships/48 hrs insufficient; Iran's Phase 1 Hormuz proposal requires ceasefire compliance Iran is demonstrably not delivering
Why our call differs from market
26 days remaining with Iran demonstrably non-compliant on ceasefire requirements; even rapid diplomatic breakthrough wouldn't restore trader confidence and normalize 50%+ traffic by month-end.
04
Iranian regime falls (significant governing change) by end-2026
By 2026-12-31
Market
18%
Our Call
12%
Δ
-6
Why we disagree
Polymarket ~18.5%; economic collapse accelerating (-6.1% GDP, 68.9% inflation, 1.8M IRR/USD); IRGC factional control remains robust; Pezeshkian 'madness' signal shows civilian discontent, not regime collapse
Why our call differs from market
IRGC coercive control remains robust despite economic crisis; 8-month timeframe is short for regime change without external military intervention or successful internal uprising, neither currently evident.
05
IRGC conducts another unauthorized escalation event within 14 days
By 2026-05-19
Market
62%
Our Call
45%
Δ
-17
Why we disagree
May 4 UAE precedent established; three-way factional struggle means hardliners can act unilaterally; no verified enforcement mechanism exists; low confidence given opaque IRGC command structure and uncertainty about Pezeshkian meeting outcome
Why our call differs from market
Market overprices 'another' escalation within 14 days; while May 4 precedent and factional opacity support baseline escalation risk, the 'unauthorized' qualifier plus short temporal window and potential hardliner retaliation constraints red
06
Nuclear deal included in any June 30 peace agreement
By 2026-06-30
Market
11%
Our Call
6%
Δ
-5
Why we disagree
Iran's 14-point proposal explicitly excludes nuclear; 20-year vs. single-digit-year gap is structurally unbridgeable near-term; IAEA has no access to verify compliance; Trump declared nuclear restrictions a red line May 1
Why our call differs from market
Iran explicitly excluded nuclear from its proposal and Trump made this a red line, making inclusion structurally implausible even under deadline desperation—market overprices possibility of compromise on fundamental incompatibility.
May 5, 2026 — The defining development of this cycle is the simultaneous emergence of two contradictory signals on May 4: Secretary Rubio's rebranding of all US combat operations as the defensive 'Project Freedom' escort mission, and the IRGC's unauthorized barrage of 15 missiles + 4 drones on UAE conducted without informing the Iranian civilian government.
President Pezeshkian's public denunciation of the strikes as 'madness' and his threat to dismiss Foreign Minister Araghchi represent the sharpest civilian-IRGC rupture of the conflict — and the most structurally dangerous development of this cycle.
It means any deal signed by civilian negotiators may lack enforcement credibility on the Iranian side.
The Strait of Hormuz is now operating against a hard economic clock. Brent crude spiked to $114.44/barrel on May 4 (+50% above pre-war), with only 2 ships transiting the US-guarded corridor in Project Freedom's first 48 hours against a backdrop of ~191 total April transits (down ~94% from pre-war ~3,000/month).
JPMorgan projects OECD inventories will hit operational minimums by May 9–30 — a hard deadline that neither negotiating team has publicly acknowledged.
With ~170 million barrels stranded on 166 tankers and ~20,000 seafarers immobilized, the humanitarian and economic toll is accelerating faster than the diplomatic track.
The formal negotiating channel survives but remains paralyzed.
Iran's 14-point counter-proposal (May 2) deliberately excludes nuclear issues and proposes a phased Hormuz reopening in Phase 1.
The US counter-response (delivered via Pakistan, May 3) remains undisclosed; Tehran is 'reviewing.' The structural blocker — a 15+ year gap between the US demand for a 20-year enrichment moratorium and Iran's 'single-digit' years offer — collapsed Islamabad talks on April 13 and is unresolved.
Polymarket prices a US-Iran diplomatic meeting by May 11 at 93.5% NO and a peace deal by June 30 at ~34% (the widely-cited 74% figure from Cointelegraph has been excluded as an unverified market-definition artifact inconsistent with all other conflict indicators).
Project Freedom launched (May 3–4): US Hormuz escort operation replaced Operation Epic Fury; only 2 ships transited successfully in 48 hours — operational viability at scale unproven
IRGC unauthorized UAE strikes (May 4): 15 missiles + 4 drones without civilian government knowledge; Pezeshkian called it 'madness' and threatened FM Araghchi dismissal — sharpest civilian-IRGC rupture of the conflict
Iran 14-point counter-proposal (May 2): Deliberately excludes nuclear issues; US counter-response delivered via Pakistan May 3, contents undisclosed, Tehran reviewing
Brent crude $114.44/barrel (+50% pre-war) on May 4 spike: JPMorgan warns OECD inventories hit operational minimums by May 9–30 — creating an external diplomatic deadline
Rubio confirms May 5: Operation Epic Fury 'officially over'; Project Freedom is defensive — rhetorical de-escalation contradicted by US sinking 6 Iranian boats same day
US-Iran diplomatic meeting by May 11: 93.5% NO on Polymarket after Islamabad talks formally cancelled May 4; meaningful window shifts to late May at earliest
Iran rial at record low ~1.8M/USD (April 29): IMF projects -6.1% GDP and 68.9% inflation for 2026; 7M Iranians food-insecure — economic collapse accelerating
Mojtaba Khamenei: zero verified public appearances through May 5; IRGC Vahidi operating as de-facto authority, undermining any deal's enforcement credibility
+~50% vs. pre-war baseline2026-05-04CNBC, Al Jazeera
$114.44/barrel
Brent Crude Intraday Spike (May 4)
+6% single-day move2026-05-04Al Jazeera, CNBC
~191 vessels
Hormuz Monthly Transits — April 2026
-94% vs. ~3,000/month pre-war normal2026-04-30CNN, Bloomberg
~170 million barrels on 166 tankers
Crude Oil Stranded (Middle East tankers)
2026-05-04Euronews
440.9 kg
Iran HEU Stockpile at 60% Enrichment
~10 weapon-equivalents if enriched to 90%2026-02-28IAEA (last verified access date)
~1,800,000 IRR/USD
Iran Rial Exchange Rate
Record low2026-04-29Iran International, CNBC
-6.1%
IMF Iran GDP Projection 2026
2026IMF
68.9%
IMF Iran Inflation Projection 2026
2026IMF
Scenarios3click to expand
Phased Hormuz deal without nuclear component emerges by late June. Economic pressure — particularly the JPMorgan OECD inventory floor projection for May 9–30 — forces a Phase 1 agreement: Hormuz reopens partially in exchange for limited sanctions relief, while nuclear issue is deferred explicitly. IRGC hardliners acquiesce under economic duress but extract concessions (enrichment at 3.67% continues). Civilian-IRGC split deepens but does not fracture the regime.
Tehran accepts US May 3 counter-proposal framework with modifications on sequencing
OECD inventory floor forces emergency US flexibility on nuclear-Hormuz decoupling
Pezeshkian retains enough civilian authority after Security Council meeting to sign a Hormuz-only deal
Brent crude retraces to $85–95/barrel over 4–6 weeks; Hormuz traffic recovers to 60–80% of normal by July; nuclear standoff continues unresolved; IRGC factional tensions persist as a tail risk
Comprehensive peace framework before June 30. Economic collapse inside Iran accelerates to a point where even IRGC hardliners accept broad terms. Pezeshkian faction consolidates civilian control after unauthorized UAE strikes create political opening. Mojtaba Khamenei makes a public appearance signaling deal acceptance under IRGC pressure. Nuclear talks begin in parallel to Hormuz deal.
Mojtaba Khamenei makes verified public appearance explicitly endorsing peace framework
IRGC Vahidi faction marginalized following Pezeshkian Security Council victory
US shows flexibility on enrichment moratorium duration (offers 10-year compromise)
IRGC hardliners derail negotiations through continued unauthorized escalation. Pakistan mediation collapses after Tehran rejects US May 3 counter-proposal. Hormuz closure extends through Q3 2026. OECD inventory floor triggers emergency SPR releases but fails to normalize energy markets at this scale of disruption. Pezeshkian loses Security Council fight and becomes a figurehead.
Tehran rejects US counter-proposal and Pakistan mediation channel collapses
IRGC conducts another unauthorized strike on Israel, UAE, or US naval assets triggering US re-escalation
Mojtaba Khamenei confirmed dead or incapacitated, triggering open IRGC factional succession conflict
Brent crude breaches $130–140/barrel; global recession risk elevates sharply; US forced to choose between military re-escalation or unilateral Hormuz opening by force; Iranian economic collapse accelerates; regime survival probability drops to 75–80% by end-2026
May 9–30 window: JPMorgan's projected date for OECD crude inventories hitting operational minimums — a supply crunch at this level would force emergency diplomatic movement or trigger another Brent spike above $114/barrel.
Tehran's formal response to US counter-proposal (delivered May 3 via Pakistan) — expected within days; rejection would collapse the Pakistan mediation channel, the last active diplomatic track.
Pezeshkian's emergency Security Council meeting request (filed May 4) over unauthorized IRGC UAE strikes — outcome determines whether civilian government retains any meaningful control over military escalation decisions.
May 11 diplomatic meeting deadline: 93.5% NO on Polymarket after Islamabad cancellation; any surprise bilateral contact before this date would be a sharp upside catalyst for deal probability.
Mojtaba Khamenei first verified public appearance — absence through May 5 fuels factional jockeying; an appearance (or confirmed death/incapacitation) would reprice regime-stability markets sharply.
Polymarket 'Hormuz normal by end of May' at 15.5% YES — watch tanker transit counts from Project Freedom escorts; if daily transits remain near zero (currently 2 ships since May 3), this resolves NO and resets deal timeline to Q3.
Nuclear breakout window has collapsed to 1–3 months post-strike (or days/weeks if Iran diverts existing 60%-enriched stockpile of 440.9 kg); IAEA access terminated Feb 28 leaves verification non-functional.
IRGC conducted unauthorized missile/drone strikes on UAE on or before May 4 without informing civilian government — President Pezeshkian publicly called it 'madness,' signaling IRGC factions can unilaterally escalate past any negotiated ceiling.
Hormuz tanker traffic at ~10% of normal (~191 ships in April vs. ~3,000/month pre-war); JPMorgan warns OECD inventories hit operational minimums by May 9–30, creating a hard deadline for supply shock.
Three-way IRGC factional struggle (Vahidi vs. Ghalibaf vs. Shamkhani) means no single Iranian authority can credibly commit to or enforce a deal — Foreign Minister Araghchi reportedly takes orders from Vahidi, not President Pezeshkian.
Iran rial at record low ~1.8M per USD (April 29); IMF projects -6.1% GDP and 68.9% inflation for 2026 with 7M food-insecure — economic collapse pressure could push hardline factions toward irrational escalation rather than concession.
US response to Iran's 14-point proposal delivered via Pakistan on May 3; Tehran confirmed receipt but is 'reviewing' — any rejection or counter triggers fresh escalation cycle with no direct communication channel.
Brent at $114.44/barrel (+50% pre-war) with OECD inventory minimums projected by May 9–30 creates asymmetric upside risk on crude — any failed negotiation round or new IRGC strike on commercial vessels is a catalyst for a spike toward $130+.
Polymarket 'permanent peace deal by June 30' divergence (34% vs. 74% depending on source) signals high uncertainty premium; the 14-point/9-point proposal gap on nuclear issues makes June 30 resolution unlikely, suggesting the higher figure is mispriced.
Shipping and marine insurance markets face sustained dislocation — 166 tankers (~170M barrels) stranded, 20,000 seafarers stuck, and Project Freedom's 2-ship success rate in three days of operations implies Hormuz normalization is weeks to months away at minimum.
Iranian regime-fall probability (18.5% by end-2026 on Polymarket) is likely underpriced given the IRGC factional split, Pezeshkian's public break with military leadership, and economic collapse trajectory — sovereign/geopolitical risk instruments tied to Iranian stability deserve a wider discount.